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FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT: WHAT IT 
COULD MEAN FOR THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ABSTRACT 
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) is a U.S. regulation 
enacted in 2010 for the primary purpose of combatting tax evasion and 
terrorism financing. FATCA attempts to meet this objective by requiring the 
financial information of all individuals the Act defines as “U.S. persons” to be 
reported to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. While FATCA strives to abate 
financial criminality, it is mired with legal issues affecting U.S. law, the laws 
of foreign nations, and international law as a whole. The problems with 
FATCA originate with the predicament of the United States trying to impose a 
domestic law on foreign nations. Many foreign nations have privacy laws that 
ordinarily would not permit collecting and reporting individuals’ financial 
information to the U.S. government. These nations therefore cannot comply 
with FATCA without violating their own laws. If these nations fail to comply, 
however, FATCA imposes stiff monetary penalties. FATCA purports to 
overcome this hurdle through the use of intergovernmental agreements. While 
the intergovernmental agreements theoretically create a lawful way for 
countries to comply with FATCA, it does not change the fact that in many 
cases countries are obtaining financial information in a manner that would 
otherwise be in violation of their privacy laws. Furthermore, they are 
essentially being forced to do so because of the threat of exorbitant fines for 
failing to comply. These issues, in conjunction with FATCA’s conflicts with 
U.S. law, demand judicial analysis of the Act’s legality. This Comment argues 
that where a domestic regulation, like FATCA, contains a plethora of legal 
issues and mandates compliance by financial threat, it needs to be challenged 
in domestic courts of law and on the international stage. If FATCA does not 
face legal opposition, or is at least not given further scrutiny, it has the 
potential to end financial privacy and calls into question the traditional 
process by which a domestic law can become international law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Washington D.C. lawyer James Jatras has called it “the worst law most 
Americans have never heard of.”1 A U.S. senator has challenged its 
constitutionality in a U.S. federal court.2 The Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act, more commonly known as FATCA, has no shortage of 
critics. FATCA was signed into law in March 2010 to combat tax evasion by 
U.S. taxpayers with foreign bank accounts.3 The Act purports to accomplish 
this end by imposing unprecedented reporting requirements on U.S. taxpayers 
holding foreign financial assets and foreign accounts.4 FATCA targets the 
financial information of all persons falling within its reach, which can go so far 
as to include citizens of other countries and individuals who have never set 
foot in the United States.5 This intrusion on financial privacy has been met 
with support from some foreign governments,6 but more commonly the 
response has been protest, originating from U.S. taxpaying individuals and 
financial entities with American clients across the globe.7 
While the reporting requirements that FATCA imposes on individual U.S. 
taxpayers are concerning to many, the burden FATCA places on financial 
institutions is perhaps the most controversial.8 The Act requires foreign 
financial institutions (FFIs) to report the financial information of all their U.S. 
taxpaying clients directly to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).9 If the FFIs 
refuse to comply, but still wish to continue providing services for U.S. 
taxpayers, their options are few and far between.10 This imposition on FFIs has 
 
 1 FATCA: An Introduction for Americans to the “Worst Law Nobody Has Ever Heard Of,” ISAAC 
BROCK SOC’Y (Nov. 4, 2014), http://isaacbrocksociety.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Introduction-to-
FATCA-for-Canadians.pdf [hereinafter ISAAC BROCK SOC’Y]. 
 2 See Robert Goulder, Litigating FATCA: Rand Paul and Financial Privacy, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2015, 
10:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/09/16/litigating-fatca-rand-paul-and-financial-
privacy/. 
 3 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, IRS (July 15, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/ 
Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-FATCA. 
 4 Id. 
 5 ISAAC BROCK SOC’Y, supra note 1 (referencing the FATCA definition of U.S. persons).  
 6 See Joe Harpaz, FATCA Poised To Go Global, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2014 10:36 AM), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/joeharpaz/2014/08/13/fatca-poised-to-go-global/. 
 7 See ISAAC BROCK SOC’Y, supra note 1. 
 8 Frederic Behrens, Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Why FATCA Will Not Stand, WIS. L. REV. 
205, 209–11 (2013). 
 9 Id. at 207.  
 10 Id. at 208. 
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generated widespread criticism from the financial world, both American and 
foreign alike.11 
FATCA has been publicly criticized for its burden on U.S. taxpayers, 
foreign governments, and financial institutions.12 There is a plethora of 
literature questioning the cost-benefit analysis of implementing FATCA, many 
of which conclude by calling for its repeal or reform.13 Some articles discuss 
whether it is worth it for FFIs to shoulder the costs of complying with the Act 
or if it is more sensible to drop American clientele and escape the arm of 
FATCA altogether.14 The far-reaching negative effects of FATCA on the 
financial world are at the center of numerous debates, but a subject that merits 
more discussion is the legacy FATCA may leave on U.S. law, international 
law, and the right to financial privacy worldwide. 
This Comment argues that despite claims to the contrary,15 financial 
privacy is a protected right and FATCA is a threat to this right, both in the 
United States and abroad. If the Act’s legality is not challenged for its violation 
of domestic and foreign privacy laws, FATCA could reshape the right to 
financial privacy, U.S. law, and international law as a whole for years to come. 
Part I begins with a discussion of the modern history of U.S. and international 
financial privacy. Despite the implementation of a variety of regulations 
limiting its parameters over the past twenty-five years, financial privacy is 
protected both in the United States and in nations around the world. Part II 
discusses exactly what FATCA is, whom it affects, and what it means for those 
affected. Part III addresses how foreign governments and FFIs can comply 
with FATCA, what options there are for noncompliance, and the consequences 
of compliance on affected individuals. Part IV analyzes the Constitutional 
issues associated with FATCA, focusing on the threat that upholding it would 
have to financial privacy. Part V addresses FATCA’s effect on foreign nations’ 
domestic laws, the current international privacy law landscape, and the future 
 
 11 See ISAAC BROCK SOC’Y, supra note 1. 
 12 See id.; Behrens, supra note 8. 
 13 See Behrens, supra note 8, at 209–10; Andrew F. Quinlan, FATCA: The End of Financial Privacy, 
DAILY CALLER (Sept. 12, 2013, 5:24 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/09/12/fatca-the-end-of-financial-
privacy/2/; Matt Welch, Kiss Your Financial Privacy Goodbye, REASON.COM (Nov. 17, 2014, 11:00 AM), 
https://reason.com/archives/2014/11/17/kiss-your-financial-privacy-go#.9anpq0:CmUm. 
 14 See Frederic Behrens, Why US Brokerage Accounts of American Expats Are Being Closed (2017), 
THUN FIN. ADVISORS (2017), http://thunfinancial.com/us-brokerage-accounts-american-expats-closed-2015/ 
[hereinafter THUN]. 
 15 Robert J. Fedor, Esq., LLC, Think You Have a Right to Financial Privacy?, ROBERT J. FEDOR, ESQ., 
LLC: TAX L. BLOG (Sept. 23, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://info.fedortax.com/blog/does-the-irs-think-you-have-a-
right-to-financial-privacy. 
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of international law. Part VI suggests that individuals and FFIs alike must 
continue to posit legal challenges to FATCA to raise awareness concerning the 
Act’s implications as a threat to financial privacy and traditional U.S. and 
international law. 
This analysis as a whole will take a critical look at the limitations FATCA 
places on financial privacy and how it affects U.S. taxpayers, foreign 
governments, and financial institutions, and what these effects could mean for 
the future of domestic and international financial privacy laws. This Comment 
begins with an explanation of what financial privacy is and how it has evolved 
over the last twenty-five years leading up to FATCA. 
I. FINANCIAL PRIVACY PRE-FATCA 
The concept of privacy can be traced back at least as far as 200 A.D.16 In 
Geneva, Switzerland, during the sixteenth century, Protestant Reformation 
leader John Calvin “embraced individual privacy as a means of self-defense 
against a predatory state.”17 Over two hundred years later, the importance of 
privacy was recognized in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
establishing the “right of people to be secure in their houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable search and seizures . . . .”18 There, the framers of 
the U.S. Constitution codified the right of individuals to be left alone from 
“every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the 
individual.”19 As society progressed and technology advanced, the 
constitutional protection of privacy began to take on a new meaning.20 The late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked the beginning of significant 
change in the concept of privacy and reform to the common law of privacy.21 It 
was not until the emergence of regulatory reform in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, however, that the United States saw the emergence of 
financial privacy.22 
 
 16 SAMUEL H. HOFSTADTER & GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 9 (1964). In some cases, the 
right can be traced back even further. See JOHN T. SOMA & STEPHEN D. RYNERSON, PRIVACY LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 8 (2008). 
 17 Welch, supra note 13.  
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 19 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 20 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 11 (2d ed. 
2008). 
 21 Id. at 25–26. 
 22 Id. at 36 (listing statutes reforming financial privacy, for instance, the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
of 1978).  
WISIACKAS GALLEYPROOFS 6/7/2017 12:27 PM 
2017] FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT 589 
The first recognition of financial privacy in U.S. law came as a response to 
the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, better known as 
the Bank Secrecy Act (the BSA).23 The BSA was intended to curtail the 
growing illegal drug trade in the United States by requiring financial 
institutions to keep records detailed enough to track an individual’s 
transactions and account activity, regardless of whether the individual was a 
law-abiding citizen.24 This encroachment on financial privacy escaped the 
attention of most Americans until the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the 
implications of the BSA in United States v. Miller.25 In Miller, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that “[t]he lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy 
concerning the information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress in 
enacting the Bank Security Act . . . .”26 While the Court held there was no 
violation of the Fourth Amendment,27 this holding was met with staunch 
criticism28 and initiatives by state courts and the federal government to fight 
back.29 
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (the RFPA) codified the 
individual’s right to financial privacy at the federal level30 and set the 
foundation for years of regulation to come.31 The RFPA established that 
Congress did in fact believe individuals had a reasonable expectation to 
financial privacy by mandating that the government follow specific procedures 
before requesting a financial institution release the financial records of its 
clients.32 If the government violated these procedural safeguards, the RFPA 
provided individuals standing to challenge the unlawful disclosures of their 
protected financial information.33 Two years after the passing of the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act, the United States adopted the 1980 Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on the 
 
 23 Welch, supra note 13. 
 24 Virginia Boyd, Financial Privacy in the United States and the European Union: A Path to Translantic 
Regulatory Harmonization, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 939 n.25 (2006). 
 25 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 443–44. 
 28 See Joseph R. Jr. Mangan, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Bank Records: A Reappraisal of 
United States v. Miller and Bank Depositor Privacy Rights, 72 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 243–44 (1981). 
 29 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 518. 
 30 See 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (2012). 
 31 Mangan, supra note 28, at 280. 
 32 Id. at 279–80.  
 33 The Right to Financial Privacy Act, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (2015), https://epic.org/privacy/rfpa/ 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2017). 
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Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (Guidelines).34 
The Guidelines established the first internationally agreed upon standards for 
individual privacy, striking a balance between the need for privacy protection 
and the free flow of information.35 The Guidelines called for OECD members 
to adopt a range of privacy protections and the free flow of information among 
the member countries that explicitly adopted these protections.36 While the 
Guidelines called for specific privacy protections, they also encouraged self-
regulation and self-imposed enforcement measures, leading to a litany of 
individualized privacy protection regulations in countries across the world.37 
Many of these regulations targeted concerns associated with keeping 
information private in an era of new technology and the Internet.38 
The European Union encouraged its Member States to form their own 
information protection laws with its adoption of the Data Protection Directive 
(also known as EU Directive 95-46-EC).39 While the Data Protection Directive 
was not directly binding, it required Member States to adhere to eight broad 
legal principles that provided for efficient data reporting and additional 
information privacy protections for the individual.40 The Directive also called 
for the establishment of Data Protection Authorities in each EU Member State 
to ensure that business entities and individuals had a forum to challenge 
possible regulatory violations.41 The Data Protection Directive took enormous 
strides in the protection of personal privacy for EU members, but the United 
States did not take such broad privacy protection measures. The United States 
responded to general privacy concerns of the Internet era with the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and the Computer Matching and Privacy 
Protection Act of 1988, but these regulations were not targeted as specifically 
protecting an individual’s right to privacy.42 Despite these regulations’ failure 
to protect the individual, privacy protection in general was on the rise, both in 
the United States and internationally. It was not until the modernization of the 
financial services sector, however, that financial privacy once again came into 
focus. 
 
 34 OECD, THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE OECD PRIVACY GUIDELINES 25 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ 
ieconomy/49710223.pdf. 
 35 Id. at 10. 
 36 Id. at 21, 23. 
 37 Id. at 23–25. 
 38 Id. at 25. 
 39 Boyd, supra note 24, at 957; see generally Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). 
 40 Boyd, supra note 24, at 958–59. 
 41 Id. at 965–66. 
 42 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 37.  
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Financial privacy regulation resurfaced in the United States with the 
passing into law of the Financial Modernization Act of 1999, better known as 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).43 The GLBA created a need to update 
financial privacy legislation by allowing financial institutions like banks, 
insurers, and brokerage houses to affiliate with one another44 and form 
financial holding companies.45 These changes led to the consolidation of the 
financial services industry, which then raised concerns that a relatively small 
group of institutions would have control over the financial information of 
millions.46 As a result of these concerns, legislators ensured that the GLBA 
required financial institutions to clearly and conspicuously disclose notice of 
privacy policies and practices to all customers,47 including “an annual notice of 
their privacy policies, and an opportunity for consumers to opt out of 
disclosing protected financial information to nonaffiliated third parties.”48 The 
GLBA’s provisions limiting the sharing of personal financial information 
demonstrate a concrete effort to protect individual financial privacy by the 
federal government. The protections afforded by the GLBA are particularly 
noteworthy when compared to the financial privacy commandeered by the 
Bank Secrecy Act nearly thirty years before.49 This trend toward recognizing 
the importance of financial privacy and the protection of privacy 
internationally would soon change with the advent of the new millennium.50 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, financial privacy regulation had 
existed for twenty-five years and had adapted to the changing technological 
landscape, but unexpected catastrophes changed the financial privacy 
framework once again.51 The September 11th terrorist attacks in the United 
States and the global financial crisis were two such catastrophes. The U.S. 
Congress responded to the September 11th terrorist attacks with the United and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
 
 43 Boyd, supra note 24, at 944; Joe Mahon, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Commonly 
Called Gramm-Leach-Bliley, FED. RESERVE HISTORY (Nov. 12, 1999), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/ 
Events/DetailView/53.  
 44 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 384. 
 45 Boyd, supra note 24, at 944–45. 
 46 Xinguang Sheng et al., An Evaluation of the Effect of US Financial Privacy Legislation Through the 
Analysis of Privacy Policies, 2 INFO. SCI. J.L. & POL’Y 943, 946 (2005); see Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6801–03 (2012). 
 47 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2012). 
 48 Sheng et al., supra note 46, at 946; see Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6802–03.  
 49 See supra text accompanying notes 23–29. 
 50 See Stefanie Olsen, Patriot Act Draws Privacy Concerns, CNET (Aug. 30, 2002, 3:31 PM), http:// 
www.cnet.com/news/patriot-act-draws-privacy-concerns/. 
 51 Id. 
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and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, better known as the Patriot Act.52 Title III 
of the Patriot Act amended financial privacy law to provide law enforcement 
with better means of catching money launderers and international terrorists.53 It 
implemented a comprehensive set of new reporting requirements on financial 
institutions.54 Requirements included mandating financial institutions to turn 
over any and all records if the Treasury Department determined an account or 
transaction to be “of primary money laundering concern,” even if the financial 
institution was located outside the United States.55 These reporting 
requirements set the precedent for the type of encroachment on financial 
privacy that individuals and financial institutions would experience just a few 
years later in the wake of a global financial crisis and the enactment of 
FATCA. 
II. FATCA DEFINED 
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act was signed into law March 19, 
2010, a date that could one day go down in history as the beginning of the end 
of financial privacy.56 Individuals can seek financial privacy for any number of 
reasons, and often times they do so through the use of tax havens.57 Countries 
such as the Bahamas, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands have long been 
recognized as tax havens.58 Some individuals use tax havens to shelter their 
wealth from the high taxes of their native countries59 and others utilize the 
banking practices of these places simply because they desire a high degree of 
financial privacy.60 Whichever the case, it is important to note that there is 
nothing illegal about using the different financial rules and regulations of 
foreign countries for these kinds of reasons;61 in fact, this Comment has 
addressed how regulators have protected the individual’s right to financial 
privacy over the last quarter century. It is not the pursuit of financial privacy 
 
 52 Viet D. Dinh, Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act, BANCROFT PLLC, http://www.bancroftpllc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/2011-11-01-Title-III-Article-updated.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 53 Id.; see generally H.R. 3162-27 tit. III (2001–2002). 
 54 Dinh, supra note 52, at 3. 
 55 H.R. 3162-27 tit. III (b)(1)(A) (2001–2002). 
 56 Nirav Dhanawade, I Got 99 Problems and They’re All FATCA, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 139, 143 
(2014). 
 57 Tax Havens/Bank Secrecy, GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, http://www.gfintegrity.org/issue/tax-havens-bank-
secrecy/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 58 MARSHALL J. LANGER, HOW TO USE FOREIGN TAX HAVENS 117 (1975). 
 59 Id. at 3. 
 60 See JANE G. GRAVELLE, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 3 (2015). 
 61 See LANGER, supra note 58, at 4. 
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that causes governments to wince, but rather the abuse of financial privacy for 
unlawful purposes.62 Thus, the problem Congress is trying to solve with 
FATCA does not lie in the concept of financial privacy itself, but rather those 
who seek financial privacy to support criminal activities. 
While there could be limitless reasons an individual may use a tax haven or 
desire financial privacy, Congress and the IRS are most concerned about tax 
evasion. Tax evasion by individual persons using FFIs reflects federal revenue 
losses in the range of $40–70 billion per year, to say nothing of the losses 
caused by corporations and other entities.63 U.S. taxpaying individuals using 
foreign accounts can capitalize on evading taxes because of the limited reach 
of the IRS.64 These individuals often take money earned and taxed in the 
United States and invest the money through the use of FFIs, which then yield 
passive income.65 This passive income, often in the form of interest or capital 
gains, although earned outside of the United States, is still income to a U.S. 
taxpayer and by law should be reported to the IRS and accordingly taxed.66 
The tax evasion problem arises because FFIs are not under the direct control of 
the IRS or any other U.S. regulatory agency, and thus have no duty to report.67 
The American clients of FFIs are not likely to take it upon themselves to do the 
required IRS reporting because of the low risk of repercussions for not doing 
so and the high potential for rewards on untaxed income. Therefore, for those 
U.S. taxpayers who are able to sleep soundly despite their questionable ethics, 
foreign accounts can be a source of tax-free income as long as FFIs stay 
outside the control of U.S. law.68 After all, how could the U.S. government 
manage to bring foreign financial institutions under the control of U.S. law? It 
would seem impossible absent the implementation of some controversial 
regulation, which for many aptly describes FATCA. 
Passed as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, 
FATCA was enacted for the purpose of helping the IRS detect tax evasion by 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 GRAVELLE, supra note 60, at 1. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Dhanawade, supra note 56, at 141–42. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See generally FATCA Information for Governments, IRS (Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/ 
Businesses/Corporations/FATCA-Governments (detailing the new requirement established by FATCA that 
FFIs now have to register with the IRS). 
 68 See generally FATCA Information for Individuals, IRS (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/ 
Corporations/FATCA-Information-for-Individuals (detailing the new requirement established by FATCA that 
certain individuals now must report to the IRS). 
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U.S. taxpayers with undeclared assets in foreign institutions.69 FATCA uses a 
two-pronged regulatory attack to accomplish this end: one directed at 
American taxpayers, defined by the Act as “U.S. Persons,”70 and one directed 
at FFIs.71 
The FATCA framework directed at “U.S. Persons” implements new 
reporting requirements on U.S. taxpaying individuals, but does not offer a 
significant departure from current tax reporting law. FATCA enacted § 6038D 
of the Internal Revenue Code, which requires U.S. taxpayers with foreign 
financial assets to report income earned on these assets to the IRS.72 This 
reporting requirement effectively puts an end to the “honor system” where U.S. 
taxpayers could choose whether or not to report income made on foreign assets 
and investments.73 Section 6038D applies to all U.S. taxpayers with foreign 
financial assets with an aggregate value of $50,000 or more and which fall into 
the definition of assets specified by the Act.74 This definition of foreign 
financial assets as set forth in § 6038D(b) specifically lists: “any stock or 
security issued by a person other than a United States person; any financial 
instrument or contract held for investment that has an issuer or counterparty 
which is other than a United States person; and any interest in a foreign entity” 
as an asset covered by FATCA.75 More broadly, § 6038D(b) also categorizes 
an asset as “any financial account maintained by a foreign financial 
institution.”76 This second categorization raises what looks like a gaping hole 
in the FATCA framework: how will the IRS have any idea whether an 
individual reporting its assets in foreign accounts will be truthful? How would 
the IRS even know whether a U.S. taxpayer has foreign assets or foreign 
accounts? Here enters the controversial prong of FATCA’s targeting tax 
evasion: requirements imposed on FFIs that are by definition not under the 
jurisdiction of U.S. law.77 
 
 69 Dhanawade, supra note 56, at 142. 
 70 See FACTA and CRS Key Terms, THOMSON REUTERS, http://fatca.thomsonreuters.com/about-
fatca/key-terms/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 71 Dhanawade, supra note 56, at 143.  
 72 Id. 
 73 See id. at 142. 
 74 26 U.S.C. § 6038D(a) (2010). 
 75 26 U.S.C. § 6038D(b)(2). 
 76 26 U.S.C .§ 6038D(b)(1). 
 77 See FATCA Information for Foreign Financial Institutions and Entities, IRS (June 2, 2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Information-for-Foreign-Financial-Institutions (imposing IRS 
requirements over FFIs). 
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FATCA requires FFIs to report personal financial information directly to 
the IRS regarding any clients that are (or should be) paying U.S. taxes, 
regardless of the fact that these FFIs are not subject to U.S. law.78 The Act 
broadly defines FFIs in § 1471(d)(4) as “any financial institution which is a 
foreign entity,” or any financial institution that is not organized under the laws 
of the United States.79 This definition includes foreign banks, foreign 
brokerage firms, insurance companies, and a number of different kinds of 
investment companies, to name only a few of the main institutions affected.80 
Simply put, FATCA compels nearly all foreign financial entities with U.S. 
clients to submit private financial information to the U.S. government, an 
imposition viewed by many foreigners and Americans alike as the IRS 
overstepping its authority.81 From the perspective of the FFI, there seems to be 
little incentive to comply. For many U.S. taxpayers, the sole appeal of using 
foreign accounts and other foreign financial services is the fact that they 
provide financial privacy free from the limitations of United States law.82 Now 
that many FFIs are suddenly subject to U.S. law and can no longer provide 
financial privacy, their appeal to U.S. taxpayers could plummet and, in turn, so 
might their business. An obvious choice for FFIs with many U.S. taxpaying 
clients is to ignore FATCA, ignore the IRS, and carry on with current 
operations. Unfortunately for these institutions, ignoring FATCA is not an 
option because compliance penalties leave individuals and FFIs with few 
options but to comply.83 
III. FATCA COMPLIANCE 
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act mandates the attention of the 
FFIs and individuals it affects, even in foreign jurisdictions, through the use of 
strict non-compliance penalties.84 The severity of these penalties and the 
nonexistence of compliance alternatives leave U.S. taxpayers with foreign 
assets little choice but to report as FATCA commands.85 Non-compliance 
 
 78 Summary of FATCA Reporting for U.S. Taxpayers, IRS (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/ 
Businesses/Corporations/Summary-of-FATCA-Reporting-for-U.S.-Taxpayers. 
 79 26 U.S.C. § 1471(d)(4) (2010). 
 80 Dhanawade, supra note 56, at 145–46. 
 81 See generally Quinlan, supra note 13; Welch, supra note 13. 
 82 See GRAVELLE, supra note 60, at 1. 
 83 See Behrens, supra note 8, at 208–09. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Dhanawade, supra note 56, at 144. 
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penalties for the FFIs are equally steep, but, unlike the individual taxpayers, 
FFIs have several compliance options.86 
The integral factor in determining how a country’s FFIs will comply with 
FATCA is what type of Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) the country 
wishes to adopt.87 IGAs provide a means by which FFIs can comply with 
FATCA without violating their respective local laws.88 To comply, countries 
must choose to adopt one of the two types of IGAs: Model 1 or Model 2.89 The 
significance in choosing a Model 1 or Model 2 IGA will be discussed in 
Subsection B, but the decision between these Model IGAs does not consider 
that a third compliance option exists. Under this third option, an FFI could 
simply choose to drop all its clients that fall under FATCA’s definition of 
“U.S. persons” rather than incurring the costs of compliance.90 While this 
option would be nearly impossible for international financial institutions with 
thousands of U.S. clients, it could be a reasonable choice for smaller financial 
institutions where the cost of keeping only a small number of U.S. clients is 
overly burdensome.91 Whether FFIs adopt a Model 1 or Model 2 IGA, or make 
the decision to discontinue offering services to U.S. taxpayers, each choice is 
met with significant consequences. 
Section A of this Part will address the specific penalties imposed on FFIs 
and U.S. taxpayers residing abroad and each party’s choices in complying with 
FATCA in the face of these penalties. Section B will address how an FFI can 
comply through the use of an IGA. Section C will consider the effects of FFIs’ 
compliance decisions and the challenges these decisions create for individuals, 
FFIs, and foreign governments alike. 
A. The Choice to Comply in the Face of Non-Compliance Penalties 
Although the U.S. government generally has no jurisdiction to enforce its 
laws on foreign soil, FATCA compels foreign individuals, financial 
institutions, and governments to acquiesce to its requirements through the 
threat of strict non-compliance penalties.92 These penalties are distinct for the 
 
 86 See IRS, supra note 67. 
 87 See Behrens, supra note 8, at 214–15. See Part III.B infra for the definition and background of IGAs. 
 88 Id. at 215. 
 89 THOMSON REUTERS, supra note 70. 
 90 See generally THUN, supra note 14. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Behrens, supra note 8, at 208–09.  
WISIACKAS GALLEYPROOFS 6/7/2017 12:27 PM 
2017] FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT 597 
U.S. taxpayer with foreign undeclared assets and the FFIs that provide these 
individuals with services.93 
FATCA requires individual U.S. taxpayers to disclose foreign asset 
information or face a penalty of $10,000.94 Foreign asset information is defined 
in § 6083D(c) of FATCA and includes four categories: 1) the name and the 
address of the FFI(s) where the individual has assets; 2) the name and address 
of the issuer for assets in the form of stocks/securities; 3) names, addresses, 
and information pertaining to contracts and financial instruments; and 4) the 
maximum value reached by the assets in the taxed year.95 If a taxpayer fails to 
provide this information to the IRS for ninety days it will face the $10,000 
penalty, and a reoccurring $10,000 penalty every thirty days until the taxpayer 
complies.96 In the event a taxpayer wants to take its chances and underreport 
the value of its foreign assets, if the IRS discovers the violation it will impose a 
harsh forty percent penalty on the value of the unreported assets.97 While 
Section 6038D(g) offers taxpayers some leeway in case the failure to disclose 
the foreign asset information was for reasonable cause and not willful 
neglect,98 ultimately anyone holding foreign assets has little choice but to 
dutifully follow the FATCA reporting requirements.99 
These penalties place a stiff price on an individual’s financial privacy, but 
they also adhere to the longstanding principle that all U.S. citizens must pay 
federal income taxes.100 The problem that arises here is that not all those 
individuals affected by FATCA are U.S. citizens.101 FATCA applies to “U.S. 
persons,” comprising residents of the United States, individuals who have a 
parent that is a U.S. citizen, a person that passes the “substantial presence test,” 
and “any other person that is not a foreign person.”102 The “substantial 
presence test” categorizes someone as a U.S. person if they have been 
 
 93 Dhanawade, supra note 56, at 143–45. 
 94 26 U.S.C. § 6038D(d)(1) (2010). 
 95 Id. § 6038D(c). 
 96 Id. § 6038D(d)(2). 
 97 Dhanawade, supra note 56, at 145. 
 98 26 U.S.C. § 6038D(g). 
 99 Robert Wood, Beware More FBAR and FATCA Reporting Charges, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2016, 12:48 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2016/10/19/beware-more-fbar-and-fatca-reporting-changes/ 
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 100 See LANGER, supra note 58, at 7. 
 101 See Dropping the Bomb, ECONOMIST (June 28, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21605911-americas-fierce-campaign-against-tax-cheats-doing-more-harm-good-dropping. 
 102 FATCA – Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, HSBC, http://www.fatca.hsbc.com/en/glossary (last 
updated July 2014) (listing other entities and types of persons that qualify as a “U.S. Person” under FATCA).  
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physically present in the United States for 31 days of the present year or 183 
days in a three-year period.103 Exactly what the catchall phrase “any other 
person that is not a foreign person” means, or who it could end up including, is 
not very clear. While there is an argument these non-U.S. citizens have strong 
enough ties to the United States to compel them to pay federal income taxes, 
this argument is significantly more tenuous in the case of FFIs, which also face 
an array of penalties for failing to comply with FATCA. 
If a FFI chooses not to report the financial information of its clientele 
classified as U.S. persons, it faces a thirty percent tax on certain “withholdable 
payments” specified by the IRS.104 These withholdable payments are defined 
in 26 U.S.C. § 1473, which includes payments of interest, dividends, and a 
dozen other forms of income, in addition to any proceeds from the sale or 
disposition of property, if the source of any of these payments is from within 
the United States.105 Withholdable payments can even include income that 
would otherwise not be subject to taxation.106 The obvious solution to avoiding 
this withholdable payments tax is FATCA compliance.107 Section 1471 
contains the comprehensive list of requirements a FFI must follow to avoid 
incurring this tax on withholdable payments.108 Section 1471(b) generally 
states that a FFI must identify its U.S. taxpaying clients and make annual 
reports regarding these clients’ accounts to the IRS (or a withholding agent) in 
accordance with certain due diligence and verification procedures.109 
Although following the stipulations detailed in § 1471(b) enables FFIs to 
avoid the withholding tax, complying has significant costs of its own.110 
Compliance with FATCA could cost foreign banks on average between $30–
80 million, by one conservative estimate.111 Failure to comply, however, could 
be just as costly depending on the number of U.S. taxpaying clients of an 
 
 103 Substantial Presence Test, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/substantial-
presence-test (last updated Dec. 16, 2015) (specifically for the 183 days in a three-year period, this includes 
the current year and two years immediately preceding the current year).  
 104 Dhanawade, supra note 56, at 145; The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), DLA PIPER, 
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 107 See id. at 146–47. 
 108 See 26 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (2010). 
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 110 See Sara Stubler, FATCA Compliance Costs Are Spiraling, MARKSNELSON (Feb. 5, 2015), 
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institution.112 Thus, some FFIs have found that the best way to avoid these 
costs is to comply with FATCA by dropping all clients that fall within the 
Act’s definition of U.S. persons.113 Other FFIs, despite the heavy costs of 
compliance, cannot afford to incur the penalties and cannot afford to dispense 
with their U.S. taxpaying clientele.114 These FFIs have little choice but to 
comply, which they have been in growing numbers through the use of the U.S. 
Treasury-created IGAs.115 
B. Compliance Through the Use of Intergovernmental Agreements 
The financial reporting measures mandated by FATCA have imposed a 
variety of challenges on the global financial community and foreign 
governments struggling to comply. In the financial industry, some FFI 
managers are unable to pay the steep compliance costs, some are unaware of 
the compliance requirements altogether, and others are simplifying the matter 
by choosing to drop American clients and investments.116 Even those FFIs that 
wish to comply and maintain their U.S. clients may be unable to do so because 
of the imposition it puts on their countries’ laws, particularly in those countries 
regarded as tax havens117 and those that have stringent financial privacy 
laws.118 FFIs located in these countries often cannot lawfully report the 
personal financial information of any of their clients, including people 
considered “U.S. persons.”119 To overcome these hurdles the U.S. Treasury 
Department has established a specialized method of FATCA compliance for 
foreign governments: IGAs.120 
 
 112 Cf. Jeanne Sahadi, You’ve Never Seen IRS Penalties Like This, CNN (June 4, 2015, 10:40 AM), 
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IGAs provide a unique compliance method to FATCA to ensure FFIs do 
not violate local laws in complying with FATCA reporting requirements.121 
The U.S. Treasury Department established two types of FATCA IGAs for 
communicating financial information to the IRS: Model 1 IGAs and Model 2 
IGAs.122 
Under Model 1 IGAs, FFIs report the personal financial information 
required by FATCA to their national governments, rather than directly 
reporting the information to the IRS.123 This avoids the legal issue of having 
FFIs report their clients’ personal information to a foreign government and 
increases efficiency by use of one IGA versus hundreds or thousands of IGAs 
with individual FFIs.124 Model 1 IGAs can be either reciprocal or 
nonreciprocal.125 Reciprocal Model 1 IGAs require a dual exchange of 
information between the foreign government and the United States while 
nonreciprocal Model 1 IGAs do not.126 This means that reciprocal Model 1 
IGAs require the United States to report the financial information of the 
foreign countries’ citizens with accounts or investments in the U.S. to that 
country’s government.127 This mutual exchange of financial information under 
reciprocal Model 1 IGAs went into effect October 2015, much to the dismay of 
advocates of financial privacy and critics of FATCA.128 
Model 2 IGAs, unlike their counterpart, do require FFIs to report the 
personal financial information of clients directly to the IRS, with the 
permission of their respective foreign governments.129 Model 2 IGAs maintain 
financial privacy more effectively because they do not require dual exchange 
of information like reciprocal Model 1 IGAs and they require personal 
information to go through the hands of one less organization—foreign 
governments.130 Eliminating foreign governments as financial reporting 
middlemen should provide comfort for many proponents of financial privacy, 
but it is not without its drawbacks. While Model 2 IGAs only require direct 
action from FFIs in theory, if the IRS needs additional information about a 
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taxpayer, it can request that the foreign government in question take action to 
enforce the reporting of this information.131 Such action not only invalidates 
the enhanced financial privacy that makes Model 2 IGAs desirable, but it can 
also lead to the quick rise of administrative costs.132 These costs are 
comparatively high to begin with because unlike Model 1 IGAs, Model 2 IGAs 
require agreements with each individual FFI.133 Thus while Model 2 IGAs 
offer an individual more financial privacy, the high cost of such privacy may 
explain why more countries are signing Model 1 IGAs.134 
IGAs serve to facilitate compliance with FATCA and lessen its imposition 
on the laws of foreign countries, but are by no means cost-free.135 This cost 
cannot be measured simply in terms of the dollars needed to negotiate the 
IGAs and enforce FATCA requirements on foreign governments and financial 
institutions. While this may be the most important cost to consider in the eyes 
of the IRS or foreign governments, individuals around the globe with ties to 
the United States are experiencing an entirely different kind of cost to FATCA 
compliance. 
C. The Cost of Compliance 
FATCA is being challenged all over the world by those who feel the 
economic and personal burdens on U.S. citizens, FFIs, and foreign 
governments have become excessive.136 The American Citizens Abroad, a 
coalition of expatriates, and lobbyist/lawyer James Jatras, principal of Squire 
Sanders Public Advocacy, are two examples of American activists publicly 
campaigning against the harms caused by FATCA.137 This outcry raises the 
question of what exactly is so troublesome about FATCA, a law primarily 
intended to combat tax evaders from hiding income in offshore and 
international accounts.138 Notwithstanding the legal issues of the Act, which 
will be discussed in Parts IV and V of this Comment, the criticism surrounding 
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FATCA can be traced to two main sources: the dollar cost of the Act’s 
implementation/compliance measures and the burden on law-abiding 
individuals who fall under the definition of a U.S. person.139 
Although the exact monetary cost of implementing FATCA and the cost to 
FFIs is ongoing, it is clear that, to date, the amount is extremely high, 
particularly in light of the expected benefit.140 In 2011, the year after the Act’s 
passage into law,141 estimates of the cost of implementing FATCA for the 
United States alone ranged from eight billion142 to thirty billion dollars.143 In 
the same year, estimates of the cost worldwide ranged from five hundred 
billion to one trillion dollars,144 with estimates for some of the larger FFIs 
reaching one hundred million dollars each.145 As time has progressed, these 
estimates have not decreased.146 According to a 2014 survey of three hundred 
financial institutions conducted by Thomson Reuters, fifty-five percent 
expected the cost of FATCA to exceed their original budgeting estimates.147 
While these numbers are staggering in their own right, the Act’s widespread 
critique becomes more justified when these costs are viewed in light of the 
expected 8.5 billion dollars in tax evasion FATCA was expected to catch.148 
This means that the IRS is getting less than a one-dollar return on every one 
hundred dollars spent worldwide to implement and comply with the Act.149 As 
one author aptly puts it, this is like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.150 
Despite such a high price for a comparatively low benefit, the dollars spent 
may not be the most costly part of FATCA. 
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FATCA has had a profound impact on all types of U.S. taxpayers the world 
over, including students studying abroad, missionaries, charity workers, 
professionals, and U.S. expatriates.151 Some of those affected are unwilling to 
bear the costs and have chosen a variety of different paths to avoid having to 
comply, ranging from selling their U.S. investments to renouncing their 
citizenship or green cards.152 In fact, from 2012 to 2014, the number of U.S. 
citizens who renounced their citizenship increased by 266%.153 The issues for 
U.S. taxpayers abroad do not rest only with those unwilling to comply with the 
Act. Some U.S. taxpayers are willing but simply unable to comply because 
FATCA has left them with no access to nearby financial services.154 FFIs that 
have responded to FATCA by dropping their U.S. tax-paying clients have left 
many of the over six million U.S. citizens living abroad and working overseas 
unable to obtain a foreign bank account.155 Thus, access to essentials such as 
insurance, pensions, Social Security, and more has become much more 
difficult,156 forcing some to relocate to areas where there are banks that accept 
U.S. taxpayers. While these are only a few examples of the challenges FATCA 
has created for U.S. taxpayers living abroad, they illustrate significant issues 
that lead many to ask whether the benefits of the Act truly exceed the costs. 
The cost of FATCA implementation/compliance is alarming and the effect 
on law-abiding individuals globally is a severe unintended consequence, but 
the problems do not stop there. As more IGAs are signed and FATCA 
continues to proliferate in the global financial community, small reactions 
today will be amplified tomorrow. Foreign firms will cease taking on clients 
the Act defines as U.S. persons, direct investment in U.S. ventures will 
dramatically suffer, and individuals will continue to renounce their citizenship 
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and economic ties to the United States.157 The high likelihood that these effects 
will emerge over the course of the upcoming years seems definitive in light of 
the few alternatives to compliance. There is, however, one means of curtailing 
the negative effects of FATCA before they spiral out of control: challenging 
the Act on the basis of whether it is in fact legal. 
IV. FATCA’S INCONSISTENCY WITH U.S. LAW 
Throughout this Comment, it has likely become clear that FATCA has 
introduced steep costs on entities and persons around the world. While its 
financial burden has been the primary catalyst for FATCA criticism, the Act’s 
detractors should also take a critical look at allegations of FATCA’s illegality. 
FATCA places a significant strain on international and foreign law, but before 
analyzing these concerns, this Comment assesses FATCA in juxtaposition with 
the supreme law of its home country, the U.S. Constitution. There are at least 
two constitutional issues concerning the implementation of FATCA: the U.S. 
Treasury Department’s authority to negotiate IGAs and the U.S. taxpayer’s 
right to financial privacy.158 The implications of these constitutional issues 
suggest that even if legislators overlook the costs imposed by the Act, FATCA 
may need to be repealed for its violation of U.S. law. 
A. Constitutionality of IGAs 
Because IGAs are international agreements, there are few forms that they 
can take and still be considered lawful; this Comment argues that Model 1 
IGAs do not fit any of these established forms. Model 1 IGAs appear to be 
very similar to treaties, but they cannot be considered as such without creating 
a serious problem in the eyes of the law. As treaties, IGAs would need to be 
established either “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate” or 
through an enumerated power of the president.159 Where neither method is 
present, the agreement is unlawful, which is precisely the issue with Model 1 
IGAs. 
Model 1 IGAs are agreements between the U.S. Treasury Department and a 
“partner government” that require all FFIs located in the partner government’s 
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jurisdiction to identify accounts of U.S. customers and report information 
about these accounts back to the United States.160 As such, IGAs must be 
categorized as one of the four types of international agreements under the U.S. 
Constitution: treaties, congressional-executive agreements, treaty-based 
agreements, or sole executive agreements.161 Of these four types of 
agreements, the only one that requires no Congressional action and does not 
build off an existing treaty is the sole executive agreement.162 
Sole executive agreements are not technically treaties because they are not 
established with the advice and consent of the Senate,163 so theoretically, they 
could reflect a legal means by which the Treasury Department uses IGAs to 
enforce FATCA. Whether sole executive agreements are a viable alternative to 
treaties, however, is a point of contention outright rejected by many 
constitutional scholars.164 Those scholars that grant sole executive agreements 
constitutional standing generally do so as a matter of necessity, and advocate 
their use only when the President conducts administrative or routine matters.165 
Even if one chooses to accept this view, implementing a new law like FATCA 
hardly seems like a routine executive matter for which a sole executive 
agreement could be utilized.166 The President’s powers, listed in Article II of 
the U.S. Constitution, are many, but finite.167 The power to “lay and collect 
taxes” is a power of Congress, not the President.168 The power to make treaties 
is a power of the President, but can only be validated by a two-thirds 
concurrence of the Senate.169 FATCA IGAs touch on both of these powers—
facilitating the collection of taxes through the use of international agreements. 
Since such interests are not derived from the President’s sole enumerated 
powers and are not administrative in nature, IGAs cannot be sole executive 
agreements. Such is the argument of the IRS, which contends that IGAs are not 
sole executive agreements but rather treaty-based agreements.170 However, 
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some experts explicitly reject this suggestion, maintaining that treaty-based 
agreements must be built off already existing treaties (and there are no such 
international agreements already in place pertaining to FATCA).171 Even if the 
IGAs were considered treaty-based agreements, in many cases these 
agreements would still be invalid because they are not executed by the 
requisite parties from each nation.172 
Thus, the IGAs that are enabling FATCA to succeed appear to have no 
constitutional standing, which is exactly the argument Senator Rand Paul made 
in the case of Crawford v. United States.173 This case was brought before the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to challenge the 
constitutionality of FATCA (and IGAs) on a number of grounds.174 While the 
constitutionality of FATCA IGAs was a main focus of the proceeding, the 
larger issue was whether FATCA violates an individual’s right to financial 
privacy.175 The case was ultimately dismissed because the Court found that 
several of the plaintiffs lacked standing and a preliminary injunction would be 
too harmful to FATCA’s fight against tax evasion.176 In spite of the ruling, the 
arguments made, particularly with respect to financial privacy, are worth a 
closer look.177 
B. Right to Financial Privacy 
Despite what the U.S. government may contend,178 the reaction to the 
holding in United States v. Miller179 and the subsequent legislation discussed in 
Part I180 strongly suggest that individuals do have a right to financial privacy. 
 
 171 Id. 
 172 For a full discussion on why IGAs cannot be considered treaty-based agreements, see Christians, supra 
note 161, at 567. 
 173 Crawford v. United States, No. 3:15-CV-00250 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2016). 
 174 Goulder, supra note 2.  
 175 Id. 
 176 Peter J. Reilly, Rand Paul Suffers Setback in Foreign Reporting Lawsuit, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2015, 3:53 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2015/10/02/rand-paul-suffers-setback-in-foreign-reporting-
lawsuit/#69962d804a49.  




 178 For a discussion of why the U.S. government contends privacy rights regarding financial institutions 
do not exist, see Fedor, supra note 15. 
 179 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (holding there was “no legitimate expectation of 
privacy” concerning financial records). 
 180 See generally The Right to Financial Privacy Act, supra note 33; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Title V. 
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This Comment argues that not only is this right protected by legislation and 
common law,181 but it is also constitutionally protected under the Fourth 
Amendment. This makes FATCA’s intrusion into financial privacy without the 
justification typically required by the Fourth Amendment yet another cause for 
concern.182 
The right to privacy is protected by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution183 and violated where the government decides in its own capacity 
to “touch upon intimate areas of an individual’s personal affairs.”184 One such 
intimate area cited directly in the text of the Fourth Amendment is “papers,” 
which the Supreme Court categorized in United States v. Boyd as an 
“owner’s . . . dearest property.”185 Boyd emphasizes that the compulsory 
production of a person’s papers by the U.S. government to be used against that 
person is an unreasonable search and seizure, violating the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.186 This principle applies directly to the compulsory production 
of financial information mandated by FATCA. 
Although FATCA has not been ruled unconstitutional in court, the 
compulsory production of financial information has been addressed in U.S. 
courts before. In Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino, the court held 
that “police violated [an individual’s] rights by obtaining from banks, without 
legal process, documents in which [the individual] had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”187 The court in Burrows found that an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their financial information and an 
expectation that such information would only be used for internal banking 
purposes.188 This recognition of financial privacy was echoed in the Maryland 
case, Suburban Trust Co v. Waller, where the court held that, “absent a 
compulsion by law, a bank may not make disclosures concerning a depositor’s 
account . . . .”189 The courts in each of these cases point out that, through 
proper legal process, the government can lawfully compel the production of 
private financial information.190 This, too, would apply to FATCA—if its 
 
 181 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 383–84. 
 182 See Behrens, supra note 8; Quinlan, supra note 13; Welch, supra note 13.  
 183 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 184 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 n.6 (1976). 
 185 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974).  
 188 Id. 
 189 Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758 (Md. App. 1979).  
 190 See id.; Burrows, 529 P.2d at 590. 
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searches and seizures were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the 
government had a warrant, or some level of individualized suspicion, it could 
lawfully instill the mandatory reporting requirements. FATCA, however, relies 
on none of these traditional reasons for conducting a search and seizure.191 
When there is no justification for a search and seizure and no basis for 
believing a particular person is guilty of a crime, a search and seizure is 
forbidden under the Fourth Amendment—“[t]hat prohibition is categorical and 
without exception.”192 Herein lies the problem with FATCA: it does not 
distinguish between the delinquent and the innocent.193 FATCA presumes to 
conduct warrantless searches and seizures of all U.S. persons’ financial 
information with no basis of belief or individualized suspicion that any one 
specific individual is evading their taxes. Absent very limited exceptions, such 
searches and seizures without individualized suspicion are unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.194 While there are arguments that an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment could apply to FATCA searches and seizures, the practical 
application of these arguments is tenuous.195 U.S. citizens have a protected 
right to financial privacy, and the lack of individualized suspicion coupled with 
FATCA’s departure from the traditional justifications intrude on this right, 
placing it in prime position to be challenged in court on constitutional grounds. 
While the unauthorized establishment of IGAs and failure to justify 
searching and seizing private financial information pose legitimate concerns 
under the U.S. Constitution, FATCA is also at odds with foreign constitutions. 
 
 191 See Goulder, supra note 2 (noting the argument FATCA lacks Constitutional standing and the 
government’s counterargument that the right to financial privacy as a Constitutional right does not exist). 
 192 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (J. Scalia, dissenting). 
 193 See Anthony B. Kim et al., FATCA Hurts Law-Abiding Americans Living Abroad, HERITAGE FOUND. 
(June 10, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/06/fatca-hurts-law-abiding-americans-living-
abroad. 
 194 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
 195 An exception to using individualized suspicion is balancing the privacy interests threatened with 
government concern for the particular law enforcement issue. See City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 32. Perhaps 
if a constitutional challenge to FATCA reached the Supreme Court, the Court would argue “the confidentiality 
of . . . financial affairs is outweighed by the advantages to society in disclosure of the information.” Burrows v. 
Superior Court of San Bernardino, 529 P.2d 590 593 (Cal. 1974). This reasoning runs parallel with the 
principle that “[t]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion 
on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). For a broad discussion of the Fourth Amendment’s Balancing 
Test, see Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, UCLA L. 
REV. 200, 226–47 (1993). While FATCA does help prevent tax evasion, it also burden millions of law-abiding 
taxpayers and takes the sensitive financial information of the many U.S. persons affected. See Kim et al., supra 
note 193. Such an extensive burden on individual privacy probably does not outweigh the governmental 
interest of catching tax evaders, and at a minimum merits judicial review.  
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In those countries with privacy laws that clash with the requirements of 
FATCA, governments have to choose between changing domestic law and 
facing the penalties of noncompliance. In many cases, this forces countries to 
sign IGAs and give up longstanding traditions of financial privacy.196 As more 
IGAs are negotiated and compliance progresses, FATCA approaches 
acceptance on a global level. While still a ways off in the case of FATCA, if a 
regulation is accepted by a cross-section of nations around the word, it can 
reach the level of customary international law.197 If a single piece of U.S. 
legislation has the potential to reach this level without the input of the 
International Court of Justice, United Nations, or another international 
governing body, it calls into question the traditional process by which 
legislation can become international law. 
V. WHAT FATCA MEANS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
While FATCA has plenty of issues, perhaps the gravest implication of “the 
worst law nobody has ever heard of”198 is its potential to alter the landscape of 
international law. The assorted issues of FATCA already addressed in this 
Comment are each important in their own right; but perhaps the shortcoming 
that could have the most potential to make serious, lasting change is the use of 
IGAs and their effects on the laws of foreign nations. This Part addresses how 
IGAs are forcing foreign nations to change and what these changes could mean 
for the future of international law. 
A. FATCA and Foreign Financial Privacy Law 
FATCA IGAs are construed as legal treaties negotiated by the U.S. 
Treasury Department with foreign governments “to ensure local laws are not 
violated by FATCA’s reporting requirements,”199 but this label is 
misleading.200 IGAs provide foreign countries and FFIs with a FATCA 
compliance mechanism that does not violate foreign laws only because, in 
many cases, it requires foreign governments to change their laws.201 This effect 
 
 196 See Osama Habib, Banking Secrecy to Remain Despite FATCA, DAILY STAR (Dec. 6, 2014, 12:20 
AM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Local/2014/Dec-06/280075-banking-secrecy-to-remain-despite-
fatca.ashx. 
 197 See generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 16–17 (3d ed. 2010). 
 198 ISAAC BROCK SOC’Y, supra note 1. 
 199 Behrens, supra note 8, at 214–15. 
 200 ISAAC BROCK SOC’Y, supra note 1. 
 201 Id. 
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is perhaps most profound on foreign governments that have longstanding 
traditions of upholding the privacy of their citizens. These countries are faced 
with the choice of dispelling their privacy protections or facing the exorbitant 
costs of non-compliance. 
Some of the foreign countries disproportionately affected by FATCA 
because of their stringent secrecy and financial privacy laws are referred to as 
“tax havens.”202 Tax havens are countries that have strict bank secrecy laws 
protecting the relationship between a banker and its client and the revelation of 
financial and personal information shared in the context of this relationship.203 
A 2015 study conducted by the Congressional Research Service provided a list 
of countries and territories regarded as tax havens, such as Switzerland, 
Lebanon, and Singapore, all of which have been historically popular countries 
for Americans in search of strict financial privacy.204 The total number of tax 
haven jurisdictions around the world varies, but there may be as few as a dozen 
or as many as sixty-five.205 Despite any negative connotations associated with 
these places due to assumptions of illegality, the truth is that these countries 
provide economic benefits to individuals and companies around the world.206 
Now these countries are being forced to forgo their longstanding traditions of 
maintaining financial privacy in the face of FATCA. 
The argument that FATCA does not force foreign countries with strict 
privacy laws to change their laws carries little weight because of the harsh 
thirty percent withholding penalty.207 Switzerland, arguably the country most 
well known for protecting financial privacy, signed a Model 2 IGA in 2013.208 
Other countries regarded as tax havens209 such as Singapore, Costa Rica, 
Lichtenstein, and Luxembourg, have followed suit (with the majority signing 
Model 1 IGAs).210 Lebanon is a tax haven that has specific laws against 
disclosing the bank account information of all depositors and consequently has 
not signed an IGA.211 Instead, Lebanon has agreed to lift this banking secrecy 
 
 202 Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States Settlement in the UBS 
Case, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 409, 413 (2010). 
 203 Id. 
 204 GRAVELLE, supra note 60, at 4.  
 205 LANGER, supra note 58, at 23. The number of tax havens ranges “[d]epending on how you count and 
the strictness of your interpretation of what constitutes a tax haven . . . .” Id. 
 206 Id. at 3–4. 
 207 Giambruno, supra note 111. 
 208 Alciere, supra note 134.  
 209 GRAVELLE, supra note 60, at 4. 
 210 Alciere, supra note 134. 
 211 See Habib, supra note 196. 
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regulation only in the case of persons that are suspected of money laundering 
or funding terrorists and, of course, U.S. citizens.212 Lebanon is not the only 
country that has yet to sign an IGA; in fact, as of September 2016, to ensure 
complete compliance with FATCA, the total number of IGAs that still need to 
be negotiated is around fifty.213 This number does not include those countries 
that have signed IGAs but have yet to pass the legislation that would actually 
put the IGA in force.214 Despite the work ahead, FATCA is well on its way to 
reaching global compliance and the number of IGAs negotiated and 
implemented is expected to continue to grow.215 
FATCA revolutionized global financial privacy practices and has taken no 
prisoners along the way; it required countries to change their laws and forced 
individuals to accept that financial privacy may just be a right of a bygone era. 
In the face of strict compliance penalties, there are many who have resigned 
themselves to this mindset. There are also those who are not so willing to let 
financial privacy expire as a right of the past, those who challenge the legality 
of FATCA, and those who question its implications for the future.216 How is it 
possible that the United States can impose a domestic regulation on the rest of 
the world? If such a regulation can be lawfully imposed, does that mean 
traditional methods of establishing customary international law could become 
obsolete? The following section analyzes FATCA in light of these questions 
and analyzes what the answers could mean for the future of international law. 
B. FATCA and the Future of International Law 
International law can broadly be defined as the law that regulates the 
relationship between states.217 It can arise through a rule so universally 
accepted as binding that it becomes a principle of customary international 
 
 212 Id. 
 213 Alison Bennett, Finish Line Unclear for Some FATCA Pacts as Banks Worry, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 
2016), http://www.bna.com/finish-line-unclear-n57982077558/. See Behrens, supra note 8, at 216. 
 214 Id. Some of these countries are still strongly resisting putting FATCA IGAs in force. See, e.g., Roger 
Aitken, FATCA: Could Israeli Injunction on US Sovereignty ‘Violating’ Tax Law Prompt Rethink?, FORBES 
(Sept. 3, 2016, 11:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2016/09/03/fatca-could-israeli-injunction-
on-us-sovereignty-violating-tax-law-prompt-rethink/#6add6f5e22d4. 
 215 Bennett, supra note 213.  
 216 See Goulder, supra note 2; Cleo Hamel, FATCA Court Challenge Fails to Make a Dent, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Oct. 1, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/cleo-hamel/fatca-court-challenge_b_8223238. 
html. 
 217 BASAK CALI, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 47 (2010). 
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law.218 It can also come into existence through written instruments, such as 
treaties or conventions like the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 
1961 or in FATCA’s own IGAs.219 In the case of international law arising from 
written instruments, the law is binding only on the parties to that specific 
agreement.220 Thus, just because South Korea signed a Model 1 IGA (which it 
did in June of 2014)221 does not mean that North Korea also agrees to such an 
exchange of financial information (which it has not).222 But what would 
happen if every other country and their respective financial institutions did 
agree to become parties to FATCA IGAs? The principles embodied in these 
IGAs would look less like the mandates of a U.S. agency and increasingly 
more like rules becoming generally accepted on the scale of customary 
international law. 
This concept makes FATCA a law with the potential for repercussions 
extending far beyond the woes it creates for American expatriates or the 
burden of its administrative implementation costs. The United States has 
already negotiated over one hundred IGAs,223 and has taken steps to ensure this 
number only increases.224 These IGAs exist on every continent except 
Antarctica225 and have infiltrated countries renowned for having the most 
stringent financial privacy laws.226 Thomas Sutter, a spokesman for the Swiss 
Bankers Association, a country known for its financial privacy, said, “With 
FATCA, there is practically no more banking secrecy for customers liable for 
American tax.”227 Yet Mr. Sutter, like so many commentators that are critical 
of the Act, misses the larger point: FATCA does not just affect those persons 
and FFIs liable to the IRS under the Act. FATCA altered foreign privacy law 
and the international exchange of private financial information, all by way of a 
U.S. domestic regulation. The power to have such a profound effect on an 
 
 218 Customary International Law, CORNELL U.L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/customary_international_law (last visited Feb. 15, 2017) [hereinafter LEGAL INFO. INST.]. 
 219 See id.  
 220 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 221 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
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 223 Atkins, supra note 115.  
 224 Ephraim Moss & Joshua Ashman, End-of-Year Deadline Increases FATCA Pressure on Partner 
Countries, SMARTBRIEF (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.smartbrief.com/original/2016/11/end-year-deadline-
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 226 Armando Mombelli, Swiss Banks To Tell All Under FATCA, SWISSINFO.CH (June 30, 2014, 11:00 
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international landscape by way of domestic policy is concerning; what is 
equally concerning is how it was accomplished. 
FATCA changed international financial privacy law and prompted the 
creation of over one hundred “treaties” within five years of its enactment.228 
Arguably, FATCA was able to reach this feat only because many foreign 
nations simply did not have the choice to refuse to comply with FATCA’s 
requirements due to the non-compliance financial penalties.229 Instead, they 
chose to sign the IGAs and concede to the exchange of private financial 
information, even in cases where it would otherwise violate their domestic 
law.230 While these nations signed these legally binding IGAs by choice, in 
many ways they are more representative of coercion by an economic bully than 
an agreement on principles among states. On a small scale, such agreements 
may not be troubling, but when over one hundred have been negotiated in the 
course of a few years,231 there is cause for concern. What were several 
agreements signed by a few foreign nations are now becoming a new global 
standard for financial privacy and the exchange of sensitive financial 
information. When principles become universally accepted by a cross-section 
of the world’s nations, such principles can become rules of customary 
international law.232 Thus, what was the content of agreements between the 
United States and a few nations could eventually rise to a level comparable to 
customary international law. 
FATCA’s intrusion on financial privacy rising to the level of customary 
international law is not something that is likely to occur overnight. For FATCA 
to become customary international law, “it would be necessary to canvass all 
of the world’s great legal systems for evidence of that principle, and also to 
reference manifestations of that principle in the actual domestic law of as many 
nations as possible.”233 However, IGAs have already begun this canvassing 
process and, as the IGAs are enacted, they represent changes in the domestic 
laws of many nations. It is well established that international law often 
emerges from principles originally formed in domestic law.234 FATCA may 
 
 228 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/ 
resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last updated Jan. 30, 2017, 4:07 PM).  
 229 Dhanawade, supra note 56, at 144. 
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 231 See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), supra note 228. 
 232 LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note 218. 
 233 BEDERMAN, supra note 197, at 14.  
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have not reached this level of international law, but the mass signings of IGAs 
and the corresponding changes in domestic law demonstrate that it is on its 
way. Further support for this contention can be found in the reactions of 
nations who support the transparency and flow of financial information 
facilitated by FATCA.235 
Although many nations had little choice but to comply, there are some 
nations that appear to agree with what FATCA is trying to accomplish236 and 
perhaps this is why its potential to change the future of international law has 
been largely overlooked. The OECD, an organization with over thirty member 
countries,237 has announced plans for a global exchange of private information 
following in the footsteps of FATCA.238 While proponents of financial privacy 
may not be overjoyed, such broad support by OECD member countries and 
other nations239 suggests that FATCA’s principles have reached at least a 
small-scale level of general acceptance. As this acceptance grows, so will 
FATCA’s effect on international law. 
VI. WHY FATCA STANDS LARGELY UNCHALLENGED AND WHAT SHOULD BE 
DONE ABOUT IT 
If the limitations to financial privacy proposed by FATCA became 
accepted worldwide and there were no other issues with the Act, this would be 
congruent with the traditional formation of international law.240 As this 
Comment has demonstrated, however, this is not the case. With so many flaws, 
it seems surprising that FATCA has faced relatively little public opposition. 
Absent a few examples, such as Crawford v. United States241 and a case 
dismissed by the Federal Court of Canada,242 legal challenges to the Act have 
been few and far between. The final Part of this Comment posits that the main 
reason FATCA has relatively few challengers is because of the emphasis on 
 
 235 See Hatice Ismail & Martin Shah, Global FATCA – the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard, 
HFMWEEKONLINE, http://www.elexica.com/~/media/Files/Articles/2014/Tax/Global%20FATCA%20article. 
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fighting terrorism in twenty-first century politics. Even if combatting terrorism 
is a main contributor in the global acquiescence to FATCA, the question 
remains as to whether FATCA’s contribution to such a cause is worth the 
pitfalls of the Act and the cost to financial privacy.243 
Political considerations played an instrumental role in FATCA’s passage 
into law in 2010244 and continue to foster the Act’s growth and discourage 
opposition. The stated rationale for creating FATCA was a cause few 
politicians wishing to be re-elected could argue against: putting an end to tax 
evasion, money laundering, and financing terrorism.245 If this purpose alone 
was not reason enough to support the Act, FATCA became law as part of the 
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, which, as its name implies, was 
created to spur job growth following the recent recession.246 Politicians 
fighting against the HIRE Act, even for the purpose of taking a stand against 
FATCA, did so at the risk of being accused of stunting job growth and 
minimizing the harm of terrorism and tax evasion. Such grave accusations 
would be damaging to any politician’s career and taking such a risk for a still 
largely unknown Act could hardly be considered worth it.247 Thus, in light of 
its purpose and the potential political costs of opposition, the HIRE Act was 
passed into law along with FATCA.248 While the Act may be costly and legally 
imposing, the financial information it provides to the government has enticed 
many nations to advocate for similar legislation to be established on a global 
scale.249 
FATCA’s acceptance by many nations and the recent global efforts to 
promote the international exchange of financial information suggest that the 
greatest obstacle to challenging FATCA may be foreign governments 
themselves. In February 2014, the OECD released a global framework for the 
exchange of financial information based on FATCA, popularly referred to as 
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the Common Reporting Standard (CRS).250 The CRS, which over seventy 
countries have pledged to adopt by 2017,251 makes economic sense because it 
will build on the information exchange systems established by FATCA 
IGAs.252 This should, in turn, reduce the costs of FATCA implementation and 
compliance.253 While cutting costs is an added benefit, it is only a part of the 
reason foreign nations are striving for a global version of FATCA. Like 
FATCA, the political rationale that foreign governments use to justify support 
for a uniform exchange of financial information is to promote national security 
by combatting terrorism, tax evasion, and other criminality.254 
The reasoning behind support for FATCA and the CRS seems sound: 
transparency should bring light to criminal schemes in the financial system by 
providing governments with global access to every individual’s financial 
data.255 In light of the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States, 
ISIS, and other ongoing threats of terrorism that have marred the early twenty-
first century, the demand for national security is high. Yet this argument rests 
on the assumption that individuals are willing to give up their right to privacy 
in return for the resulting increase in national security. While there are some 
willing to make this sacrifice in the name of national security, there are plenty 
who are not, which is perhaps best evidenced by the 2013 National Security 
Agency (NSA) leaks.256 
The NSA scandal exposed the extent to which the U.S. government was 
spying on its citizens, irrespective of individualized suspicion or probable 
cause,257 and led many to conclude that the government overstepped its 
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bounds.258 The U.S. government can justify its intrusion on privacy exposed by 
the NSA leaks in the same way it could justify FATCA’s intrusion on financial 
privacy: “by balancing [the] intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against [the] promotion of legitimate government interests.”259 Courts 
may ultimately find that this argument is convincing and that the promotion of 
ensuring national security outweighs FATCA’s intrusion on privacy, however 
such an issue should be addressed in court and not assumed by the 
government. If the mixed public response to the NSA security leaks is any 
indication, the appropriate balance between promoting national security and 
violating individual financial privacy is not black and white.260 
Whether foreign governments support the exchange of information 
accomplished by FATCA, have been bullied into compliance, or are simply 
unwilling to challenge the Act, it is up to the affected FFIs and individuals 
themselves to call attention to the Act’s affront to privacy. This Comment has 
discussed how FATCA could be challenged in the United States—by raising 
challenges in court on constitutional grounds.261 In countries that have signed 
Model 2 IGAs or no IGAs at all, the threat of the IRS enforcing FATCA may 
seem too remote to warrant a legal challenge to the Act.262 However, in the 
vast majority of countries in which Model 1 IGAs have been signed,263 citizens 
of foreign nations should bring claims for violations of privacy where it 
violates longstanding law.264 If individual claims prove unsuccessful in 
domestic courts, the next step would be to challenge FATCA on an 
international stage. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which, 
unlike the International Court of Justice, hears complaints from individuals,265 
could be an ideal forum to make the case that FATCA is depriving U.S. 
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persons worldwide of their right to financial privacy.266 Admittedly, in terms of 
human rights violations, FATCA’s imposition on financial privacy may be low 
in priority compared to some human rights violations facing the ECHR.267 But 
even if the ECHR were to refuse to hear the FATCA cases, the resulting 
increase in international awareness for FATCA, the impending CRS, and what 
these regulations could mean for the future of financial privacy would be a 
success for FATCA critics worldwide. 
As regulations like FATCA and the CRS become increasingly 
commonplace, the claim that there is a right to financial privacy will begin to 
dissipate and the vast majority of individuals will be unaware before it is too 
late. In the United States, allowing FATCA to prosper without any 
constitutional challenges would set a precedent for violating privacy and give 
the executive branch the power to create IGAs almost indistinguishable from 
treaties.268 Although unsuccessful to date,269 challenging FATCA’s legality in 
court is the best means by which U.S. citizens can demonstrate that legislators 
cannot assume that changes to the traditional understanding of the right to 
privacy and the power to make treaties are automatically justified for social 
and political ends. Similarly, citizens of foreign nations can use their domestic 
courts or pursue a case in an international court to take a stand against the 
imposition of U.S. domestic regulations.270 If the number of these challenges 
grow, FATCA and its impending counterparts will gain the widespread 
recognition necessary for individuals to take a critical look at the Act and how 
it is changing financial privacy, U.S. law, and international law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act is capable of eliminating 
financial privacy, a right protected by the U.S Constitution and the laws of 
foreign nations, for anyone eligible to pay U.S. taxes regardless of where they 
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live.271 To facilitate international compliance, the U.S. Treasury Department 
has been negotiating IGAs that they likely do not have the constitutional 
standing to make.272 It is clear that the Act is riddled with issues. If FFIs can be 
forced to change the reporting of private financial information in spite of the 
laws of their home countries, what does this mean for the future of financial 
privacy around the world? If the United States or any other nation can compel 
global compliance for one of its regulations, does this change our 
understanding of the process by which legislation can rise to the level of 
international law? FATCA opens the door to a possible future where 
international law is established not necessarily because it is universally 
accepted but because other nations and their citizens are faced with financial 
threats that force compliance. If other superpower countries implement new 
regulations that rise to prominence in the same manner as FATCA, the 
framework of international law could undergo significant change in the years 
to come. There is a chance for FFIs and individuals to challenge FATCA in 
domestic courts, and perhaps even bring awareness of the Act’s threat to 
financial privacy to the international stage in a forum such as the ECHR. 
However, until more significant strides are taken, FATCA will enjoy continued 
success in reshaping international and domestic law, in addition to pushing 
financial privacy into a right of the past. 
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